Lecture by ICE Fellow Eric Campbell
Haldeman 41 (Kreindler Conference Hall)
Nearly 150 years ago, Nietzsche recommended and attempted an evaluation of the value of our inherited concepts, especially moral concepts. Since such concepts have plausibly been developed and maintained by nonnormative forces of selection and ideology, he suggested that this project in conceptual ethics be undertaken from a skeptical perspective. Eric Campbell argues that this project ought to be a central part of metaethics, and for pragmatic naturalism as a methodology for pursuing it. Pragmatic naturalism has two primary goals. The first is to provide functional explanations of problematic or otherwise interesting philosophical concepts. The second is to draw on these use-explanations in order to do conceptual ethics. He tries to show that three widespread and interacting assumptions obscure the importance of the project that Nietzsche recommended, and that pragmatic naturalism is a promising methodology for undertaking it. The first assumption is that investigating the semantics of moral discourse is an important part of doing moral metaphysics, since such an approach can play a vital role in defending or defeating moral error theory. The second is that error theory is a necessary prelude to any systematic critique of moral discourse. The third is, in the words of Richard Joyce, “the unexamined assumption that morality is a Good Thing without which we’d all be worse off.” He tries to show that a skeptical and pragmatically naturalistic approach to metamorals can illuminate what is wrong with these assumptions. In particular, he tries to show how these assumptions have combined to obscure the fact that several metaethical views purporting to vindicate moral discourse by protecting it from error theory not only fail to vindicate it, but strongly support the most common normative critique of moral discourse, namely that it systematically inhibits important forms of self-awareness, resulting in myriad downstream pathologies.
